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19 The purpose of this paper is to discuss the issue of Treaty reform and its consequences for
20 monetary policy. Inter alia, the changes include that the institutional set-up will be subtly
21 changed and the European Central Bank (ECB) will be grouped in the ﬁrst part of the Treaty as
22 one of the “other institutions and advisory bodies”. Possibly more importantly, the euro area as
23 such will be in the position to act legally as itself within the European Union (EU) legal
24 structures. The Eurogroup also will be ofﬁcially recognized (“Euro-Ecoﬁn-Council”). President
25 Jean-Claude Trichet's concern about the status of the ECB under the new Treatyand fear that by
26 including the bank in a list of EU institutions implies a risk that EU member states could
27 formulate policy recommendations to the ECB, but may also lead to more central bank
28 conservatism with the ECB as explained in our analysis. In this paper we analyze the trade-off
29 between central bank independence and conservatism with New Keynesian framework
30 following Woodford [Woodford, M., 2003. Interest and prices: foundations of a theory of
31 monetary policy. Princeton University Press, Princeton.] and others. Our conclusion is that the
32 trade-off between central bank independence and conservatism still holds within the New
33 Keynesian framework. Politicians should therefore realize that their attempts to downgrade
34 ECB's independence legallyand verbally will only increase its conservatism in order to maintain
35 the same inﬂationary bias and limit the ECB's degrees of freedom with respect to its interest
36 rate policy.











50 The purpose of this paper is to discuss the issue of Treaty reform and its consequences for monetary policy. Inter alia, the
51 changes include that the institutional set-up will be subtly changed and the European Central Bank (ECB) will be grouped in the
52 ﬁrst part of the Treaty as one of the “other institutions and advisory bodies”. Possibly more importantly, the euro area as such will
53 be in the position to act legally as itself within the European Union (EU) legal structures. The Eurogroup also will be ofﬁcially
54 recognized (“Euro-Ecoﬁn-Council”). The rules for enhanced cooperation have also been further facilitated from the Treaty of Nice,
55 also applying for the area of economic governance (e.g. euro area coordination, tax policy, exchange rates).
56 In essence, the content of the new proposed reform treaty is very similar to that of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for
57 Europe. It has just been modiﬁed and rephrased, as many heads of the different EU governments have already conﬁrmed. In July
58 2007, an Inter Governmental Conference (IGC) has been held to discuss the “new” Treaty and to seek political support for all the
59 amendments to the original treaties that are in the reform of the Treaty. The major proposed changes include the removal of the
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63 three-pillar structure of the EU, more democracy, change of the institutional setup of the Union, improvement of the solidarity and
64 security within the Union and enhancement of the position of the EU on the global stage (European Commission, July 10, 2007).
65 The three-pillar structure will be abolished, as to simplify the structure of the EU. The structure will be reorganized, with more
66 emphasis on foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs. More democracy is realized by giving national parliaments
67 and the European Parliament (EP) a bigger say, while the power of the European Commission (EC) will decrease. The EP will be on
68 equal footing with the Council of Ministers in many areas in terms of decision making. Also, a withdrawal option will be included,
69 as to state that member states are part of the EU by their own choosing. The change in the institutional set-up of the ECB will be
70 most important for the working of monetary policy and the status of the ECB. The latter effects will be singled out later in the text
71 and treated in more detail. Furthermore, decision making will be made more swiftlyand more commonly supported by the system
72 of qualiﬁed majority voting, which will be introduced in more than forty new areas. This is also going to apply to economic
73 governance. These measures include the giving up of veto power in many areas (including the ECB's powers over ﬁnancial
74 regulation), the appointment of a permanent President of the European Council, and a reinforcement of the Commission's
75 authority. Also, as will be clear later on, it is easier to amend the treaty in the new form, by means of co-decision and qualiﬁed
76 majority voting, so that a new IGC will not be necessary.
77 Although Article 108 of the Treaty still states that “neither the European Central Bank, nor a national central bank, nor any
78 member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Union institutions or bodies, from any government of
79 a Member State or from any other body”, the fact that the ECB will be grouped with institutions such as the EC and the EP makes
80 that its special status may or will be affected. This may have consequences for the functioning of the ECB in conducting effective
81 monetary policy. The grouping of the ECB with other EU institutions will affect its independence and must be considered as an
82 extremely dangerous development.
83 In this paper we will argue that a Thomas Becket effect is likely to occur after a reduction of central bank independence.
1 Once
84 appointed as a central banker, ofﬁcials learn to behave like an independent central banker. Faced with the reduction in their
85 independence, they develop a more conservative attitude and become like Wim Duisenberg's “whipped cream”: the more
86 politicians stir them, the stiffer they become.
2 We argue that it is optimal for society to select central bankers that have the right
87 degree of conservatism (given the present level of independence) and have the “whipped cream” property that makes them more
88 conservative, if and when the level of independence is reduced. Both the Thomas Becket effect and the “whipped cream”
89 characteristic are perceptible with the (newly) appointed members of the Governing Council of the ECB and perhaps most
90 remarkable with President Trichet after the discussion of Treaty reform including the change of the institutional set-up and the
91 grouping of the ECB in the ﬁrst part of the Treaty as one of the “other institutions and advisory bodies”. President Trichet's concern
92 about the status of the ECB under the new Treatyand fear that byincludingthe central bank in a listof EU institutions implies a risk
93 that EU member states could formulate policy recommendations to the ECB, but may also lead to more central bank conservatism
94 with the ECB as will be explained by our analysis.
95 Section 2 discusses brieﬂy the time inconsistency problem and the rationale for central bank independence based on Rogoff
96 (1985) and others. In Section 3 we analyze whether there exists a trade-off between independence and conservatismwithin a New
97 Keynesian framework following Woodford (2003) and others. Section 4 draws some conclusions.
98 2. The rationale for central bank independence
99 The Maastricht Treaty has made the ECB very independent. Nowadays is it widely believed that a high level of central bank
100 independence and an explicit mandate for the bank to deliver a low and stable rate of inﬂation are important institutional devices
101 to assure price stability. It is thought that an independent central bank can give full priority to low levels of inﬂation. In countries
102 with a more dependent central bank other considerations (notably, re-election perspectives of politicians and a low level of
103 unemployment) may interfere with the objective of price stability. In that context the German central bank is often mentioned as
104 an example. The Deutsche Bundesbank was relatively autonomous; at the same time, Germany had one of the best post-Second
105 World War inﬂation records amongthe OECDcountries.Indeed,the statutes of theECB arelargelymodeledafter the lawgoverning
106 the Bundesbank. Why would central bank independence, ceteris paribus, yield lower rates of inﬂation? The theoretical reasoning
107 in this ﬁeld stresses the time inconsistency problem (see Kydland and Prescott,1977; Barro and Gordon,1983). The basic idea behind
108 the time-inconsistency problem can be explained as follows. Suppose, the policy maker announces a certain inﬂation rate that (s)
109 he considers optimal. If private sector agents take this announced inﬂation rate into account in their behavior, it becomes at that
110 time optimal for the government to renege and to create a higher than announced inﬂation rate. The reason for this is that a burst
111 of unexpected inﬂation yields certain beneﬁts. For instance, unexpected inﬂation reduces real wages, thereby increasing
112 employment. Of course, this is only part of the story. The next step is to add rational expectations. Under rational expectations
113 economic agents know government's incentive to create unexpected inﬂation and take this into account in forming their
114 expectations. Government has no other choice than to vindicate these. It is clear that the inﬂation rate will be higher than under
115 the situation in which government would stick to its promise. No matter which factors exactly cause the dynamic inconsistency
116 problem, in all cases the resulting rate of inﬂation is sub-optimal. So in the literature devices havebeen suggested toreduce this so-
1 The Thomas Becket effect was coined by the ﬁrst and former Chief Economist of the ECB, Otmar Issing, and expresses the fact that it takes time for a central
banker to learn to behave independently from politics.
2 This comparison was introduced by the ﬁrst and former President of the ECB, Wim Duisenberg, who stated (in Dutch): “Centrale bankiers zijn als slagroom:
hoe meer je in ze roert, hoe stijver ze worden”.
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117 118 119 120 121 122 called inﬂationary bias. Rogoff (1985) has proposed to delegate monetary policy to an independent and ‘conservative’ central
123 banker. Conservative means that the central banker is more averse to inﬂation than the government, in the sense that he places a
124 greater weight on price stability than the government does. Why would a central banker be more inﬂation averse than the
125 government? Two main differences have been pointed out in the literature between preferences of the government and those of
126 the central bank (see Cukierman,1992). One relates to possible differences in the time preference of political authorities and thatof
127 central banks. For various reasons, central banks tend to take a longer view of the policy process than do politicians. The other
128 difference concerns the subjective weights in the objective function of the central bank and that of government ofﬁcials. It is often
129 assumed that central bankers are relatively more concerned about inﬂation than about other policy goals such as achieving high
130 employment levels and adequate government revenues. If monetary policy is set at the discretion of a ‘conservative’ and
131 independent central banker, a lower average time-consistent inﬂation rate will result. Eijfﬁnger and Hoeberichts (1998) analyzed
132 the trade-off between central bank independence and conservatism within the traditional Lucas supply framework with rational
133 expectations and concluded that this trade-off between independence and conservatism exists. We will now analyze whether this
134 conclusion still holds within a New Keynesian framework following Woodford (2003) and others. In this framework, we abstract
135 from the inﬂationary bias and the time-inconsistency problem to motivate central bank conservatism. Instead, we assume that the
136 government has a relatively stronger preference for stabilization of the output gap than society as a whole.
137 3. The trade-off between central bank independence and conservatism within a New Keynesian framework
138 The forward-looking New Keynesian model is the standard workhorse model for monetary policy analysis. This model, with a
139 forward-looking Phillips curve (or aggregate supply function) and a forward-looking IS-curve (or aggregate demand function),
140 provides realistic interactions between nominal and real variables in the economy. The two base equations are derived from
141 optimizing behavior by the forward-looking agents that live in the economy with sticky prices and. On top of that, we introduce
two policymakers (called government and central bank) who inﬂuence monetary policy. Monetary policy is set after the two
143 policymakers have bargained over the appropriate monetary policy rule.
We have the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve and an IS equation, following Giannoni and Woodford (2003):




146 πt ¼ βEtπtþ1 þ κxt þ ut ð2Þ
148 where xt is the period t output gap, Etxt+1the current period expectation of next period's output gap, σ is the interest elasticity of
149 the output gap, it the current period nominal interest rate, Etπt+1the current period expectation of next period's inﬂation rate, rtn
150 the neutral real interest rate in period t, β the discount factor, κ the sensitivity of inﬂation to the output gap and ut a supply shock
151 (cost push shock). The monetary policy maker fully controls the short-term nominal interest rate it. The micro-foundations of the
model imply that σ, κN0 and 0bβb1.
For society as a whole, the welfare theoretic loss function is of the form:







155 where β is again the discount factor and the per period loss function is given by:
Lt ¼ πt ðÞ
2þλ xt−x  ðÞ
2 ð4Þ
157 where x⁎ is a certain optimal level for the output gap and λ is the weight attached to output gap stabilization relative to inﬂation
158 stabilization. Woodford (2003) justiﬁes the convenient and widely assumed speciﬁcation of the quadratic loss function (4) by
159 showing that it represents a second-order Taylor series approximation of the representative household's expected utility.
Woodford (2003) also derives an optimal weight on output stabilization λ⁎ that depends on the structural parameters of the
161 model. The two policymakers that are relevant for the way interest rates are set, the government and the central bank are
characterized by the following one period loss functions:
LG
t ¼ πt ðÞ
2þλ
G xt−x  ðÞ
2 ð5Þ
163 LCB
t ¼ πt ðÞ
2þλ
CB xt−x  ðÞ
2 ð6Þ
165 166 where superscript G indicates the government and superscript CB indicates the central bank. The only difference between these
167 two loss functionsand theloss functionfor societyasawholelies in theweightthatis attachedtostabilizationof theoutput gap.In
168 this model, we suppose that the government, for political reasons, is more concerned about deviations in the output gap than
169 society. So, it attaches a higher weight to stabilization of the output gap than society does (λ
GNλ ⁎), which is suboptimal for social
170 welfare.
3
3 Note that the target for the output gap (x⁎) is the same for the central bank and the government. This implies that the economy does not suffer from an
inﬂationary bias, in equilibrium, independent of the central bank's independence or conservatism. There may be good reasons to assume that the government
actually aims for a higher output gap. By abstracting from an ambitious output target for the government, we bias our model against central bank conservatism
and independence. Introducing a government with a higher target for the output gap would strengthen our results.
122
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171 Monetary policy is implemented by the central bank, but the central bank is not completely independent in the way it sets
172 policy. The central bank faces pressure from the government about the weight that should be given to the objective of output
173 stabilization. The strength of the central bank in the negotiations with the government, or her independence from politicians, is
174 captured parameter γ, with 0bγ≤1. The loss function that effectively governs monetary policy is a weighted average of the central
bank's loss function and the government's loss function with weights γ and 1−γ attached to the central bank and to the
government, respectively.
LP
t ¼ 1−γ ðÞ LG
t þ γLCB
t ¼ πt ðÞ






178 In the remainder of the paper the optimal levels for inﬂation and the output gap have been set at zero, both for the central bank
180 and the government. This implies that our results hold even if the government does not suffer from an inﬂationary bias.
181 Introducing a positive bias for the government would only strengthen our results. Setting the target values at zero, and minimizing






185 This ruleis optimal inthe sensethatit minimizesloss function(7),sothatgiventhepreferencesof boththegovernmentandthe
186 central bank and also given theweight that bothpolicymakers have in determining the monetary policyloss function (7), targeting
187 rule (8) is the best policy rule that can be implemented. This targeting rule implies that the central bank should set nominal
188 interest rates in such a way that the output gap moves in an opposite direction as inﬂation, scaled by the slope of the Phillips curve
189 κ divided by the “effective” weight on stabilization of the output gap (1−γ)λ
G+γλ
CB. If this preference for output stabilization is
190 very high, the coefﬁcient on inﬂation in Eq. (8) is very low, which means that the cost-push shocks ut will mostly affect inﬂation
191 and will hardly be stabilized by letting the output gap ﬂuctuate. The opposite will happen if the preference for output stabilization
192 is very low.
193 This policycan be implemented when the monetary policymaker set its short-term nominal interest rate i according to a Taylor
194 rule. This rule implies that the short-term nominal interest rate moves with inﬂation and the output gap, with the weights φπ and
195 φx optimally chosen: it=i⁎+φπ(πt)+φx(xt−x⁎). It is beyond the scope of this paper to derive an exact mapping between the optimal
196 weights in the optimal Taylor rule and the optimal targeting rule, but it can be done.
197 In the institutional design stage, society knows the degree of independence γ that is granted to the central bank as well as the
preferences of the government. Its task, at this stage, is to pick a central banker with such preferences that the effective weight on
stabilization of the output gap is in line with society's optimal weight. To ensure this, society should select a central banker with








or γε ¼ λ
G−λ
  with ε ¼ λ
G−λ
CB ð9Þ
203 In Eq. (9), ε can be interpreted as the level of central bank conservatism vis-à-vis the government. Because the government
204 attaches too much weight to output stabilization (λ
GNλ⁎), society selects the central bank that compensates by being conservative
205 in the sense that she puts relative more weight on inﬂation stabilization rather than output stabilization. The equation above also
206 shows that the central bank needs to be more conservative, the less independent it is (so, the lower γ). So, if the government
207 interferes a lot in the formulation of monetary policy, it will encounter a more conservative central bank. If, on the other hand, the
208 central bank is completely independent (γ=1) and determines monetary policy without any interference from the government, it
209 is optimal for society to simply pick a central banker whose preference foroutput stabilizationis equal tothe optimal value derived
210 by Woodford (2003),s o( λ
CBNλ⁎). The less independence the central bank has (low γ) and the more excessive weight politicians
211 attach to stabilization of the output gap (λ
GNλ⁎), the more conservative the central bank has to be in order to conduct optimal
212 monetary policy.
213 4. Policy implications of the trade-off between independence and conservatism
214 In other words, delegating monetary policy to an independent and ‘conservative’ central bank will reduce the variability of
215 inﬂation and improve welfare. There is an optimal level of independence cum conservatism (γɛ⁎). Under certain assumptions, this
216 is shown graphically in Fig. 1. Optimal means that the loss function of the society (Eq. (3)) is minimized.
217 It also follows from Eq. (9) that both independence and the inﬂation aversion of the central bank matter. If the central banker
218 has the same inﬂation aversion as government (i.e. ɛ=0), the independence does not matter. And similarly, if the central bank is
219 fully under the spell of government (i.e. γ=0), the conservatism of the central bank does not matter. There are various
220 combinations of γ and ɛ that may yield the same outcome, including the optimal one. We can illustrate this in Fig. 2.
221 From a practical point the concept of a ‘conservative’ central banker seems, however, void, if only since the preferences of
222 possible candidates for positions in the governing board of a central bank are generally not very easy to identify and may change
223 after they have been appointed. So, it is hard to ﬁnd some real world example of a ‘conservative’ central banker. Still, one could
224 argue that the statute of the central bank could be relevant here, especially with respect tothe question of whetheror not it deﬁnes
225 price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy. Whether or not the statute of a central bank deﬁnes price stability as the
4 S.C.W. Eijfﬁnger, M.M. Hoeberichts / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2008) xxx–xxx
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Please cite this article as: Eijfﬁnger, S.C.W., Hoeberichts, M.M., The trade-off between central bank independence and
conservatism in a New Keynesian..., European Journal of Political Economy (2008), doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.06.001UNCORRECTED PROOF
226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 primary policy goal, can be considered as a proxy for the ‘conservative bias’ of the central bank as embodied in the law (see
244 Cukierman, 1992).
245 In the institutional design stage of the ECB, when its statutes were drawn up, the ECB was granted a very high degree of
246 independence (γ close to 1). This arrangement allowed the ECB to have the best of both worlds by having preferences close to the
247 social optimum (λ
CB close λ⁎, see Eq. (9)) and still be a credible inﬂation ﬁghter. It is also obvious from Fig. 2 that if the
248 independence granted to the ECB was going to be reduced (lower γ), it would be optimal to appoint more a conservative central
249 banker (higher ε, lower λ
CB). The reduction in independence combined with an increase in conservatism ensures that society shifts
250 along the optimal curve in Fig. 2. This is summarized in the following proposition.
251 Proposition 1. It is in the interest of society to appoint a monetary policy maker endowed with the optimal combination of
252 independence and conservatism vis-à-vis the government. It is also in the interest of society that this policy maker, when faced with a
253 reduction of its independence, becomes more conservative.
254 Proof. Starting from the optimal (middle) curve in Fig. 2, lower independence pushes society to the left of the optimal curve and
255 makes it worse of. An increase in conservatism pushes society upwards and back to the optimal curve.
256 However, it can be argued that the monetary policy makers (or the members of the Governing Council in the case of the ECB)
257 are still the same people, with the same preferences. Moreover, when their term ends they will be replaced by a new member,
258 selected bythe same government(s) that weakened the independence of the central bank. Inpractice, however, the Thomas Becket
259 effect is likely to occur after a reduction of central bank independence. Once appointed as a central banker, ofﬁcials learn to behave
260 like an independentcentral banker. Facedwiththe reduction in theirindependence, they develop a more conservative attitudeand
261 become like Wim Duisenberg's “whipped cream”: the more politicians stir them, the stiffer they become. We argue that it is
262 optimal for society to select central bankers that have the right degree of conservatism (given the present level of independence)
263 and have the “whipped cream” property that makes them more conservative, if and when the level of independence is reduced.
264 Both the Thomas Becket effect and the “whipped cream” characteristic are perceptible with the (newly) appointed members of the
265 Governing Council of the ECB and perhaps most remarkable with President Trichet after the discussion of Treaty reform including
Fig. 1. The optimal level of central bank independence and conservatism.
Fig. 2. Trade-off between conservatism and independence of a central bank.
243
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267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 the change of the institutional set-up and the grouping of the ECB in the ﬁrst part of the Treatyas one of the “other institutions and
285 advisory bodies”. President Trichet's concern about the status of the ECB under the new Treaty and fear that by including the
286 central bank in a list of EU institutions implies a risk that EU member states could formulate policy recommendations to the ECB,
287 but may also lead to more central bank conservatism with the ECB as explained by our analysis.
288 5. Concluding remarks
289 So from a theoretical point of view it can be argued that an independent and conservative central bank improves the social
290 welfare implications of monetary policy and ensures optimal stabilization policy in a world where the government puts too much
291 emphasis on stabilizationof the output gap. Moreover, the trade off between central bank independence and conservatism enables
292 the central bank to continue implementing optimal monetary policy even after its independence is reduced, by becoming more
293 conservative. If a government, for political reasons, decides to limit the central bank's independence, it is in the interest of society
294 that this is countered by a more conservative central bank. This holds under the ceteris paribus assumption that society's
295 preferences do not change.
296 What about the empirical evidence? A substantial amount of empirical research supports the inverse relationship between
297 central bank independence and the level of inﬂation (see also Eijfﬁnger and De Haan,1996 for a review). The negative relationship
298 between indicators of central bank independence and inﬂation in OECD countries is quite robust, also if various control variables
299 are included in the regression. Still, it should be noted that a negative correlation does not necessarily imply causation. The
300 correlation between both variables could be explained by a third factor, e.g. the culture and tradition of monetary stability in a
301 country. However, sometimes central bank independence is a condition sine qua non to establish the culture and tradition of
302 monetary stability in a country (e.g. in France).
303 President Jean-Claude Trichet's concern about the status of the ECB under the new Treatyand fear that by including the bank in
304 a list of EU institutions there is a risk that EU member states could formulate policy recommendations to the ECB is not only true,
305 but may also lead to more conservatism (inﬂation aversion) with the ECB. Central bankers are like Duisenberg's “whipping cream”
306 faced with the reduction in their independence, they develop a more conservative attitude.
307 As we argued above both the Thomas Becket effect and the “whipped cream” characteristic are perceptible with the (newly)
308 appointed members of the Governing Council of the ECB and perhaps most remarkable with President Trichet after the discussion
309 of Treaty reform. PresidentTrichet's concern aboutthe statusof theECB under thenewTreatyandfearthatbyincludingthe central
310 bank in a list of EU institutions may also lead to more central bank conservatism with the ECB as explained by our analysis.
311 Politicians should realize that their attempts to downgrade ECB's independence legally and verbally will only increase its
312 conservatism in order to maintain the same monetary policy stance and limit the ECB's degrees of freedom with respect to its
313 interest rate policy. The consequences of these attempts are relative higher interest rates in the eurozone, being exactly the
314 opposite of what they wish to achieve.
315 Sometimes it is better to tie yourself, like Odysseus, to the mast to resist the siren voice.
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